In order to gain a better understanding of human behaviour, Economics seeks to work with other disciplines such as Psychology, Sociology, or Anthropology (Behavioural Economics). Unlike neoclassical economic theory, behavioural economics does not assume a rational individual. On the contrary, it focuses on an irrational (bounded rational) individual while revealing what really infl uences his decision and his actions in order to respond more adequately to public needs, increasing the effi ciency of public-service provision. Th e aim of the paper is to investigate the factors of willingness to pay for public services. Th e willingness of individuals to pay depends on factors such as aff ection and sympathy, conviction, compassion, regret, respect, warm glow, commitment to society, appreciation, invitation to participation, fundraising method and tax policy. Th e signifi cance of the research conclusions lies in initiating a new perspective on the possibilities of securing public services.
Introduction
How much would we ask for the distribution of leafl ets ? How much are we willing to pay for a cup of coff ee ? Th e answer to these questions does not take long. Let us say we are willing to pay a maximum of €1 for a cup of coff ee. It is likely that most people will respond roughly the same way. Does that mean we all like coff ee the same ? Do we all have the same disposable income ? Are we all considering the same alternatives ? So what process are we going through when deciding when we are all about to give €1 for a cup of coff ee (Ariely and Kreisler 2018) .
Unlike the observed behaviour of the planets circling the Sun without obvious intent, human behaviour is deliberate and aims to achieve set, preferred goals. An individual with diff erent resources, such as time, money, work eff ort, capital and so on, at their disposal uses these resources to achieve the most preferred goal. So, they choose an option, a private or public goods that will satisfy them the most (Rothbard 2001) . Individual preferences as reported by Rothbard (2001) can be inferred from the behaviour chosen by the individual. Many factors infl uence the individual's behaviour and the resulting decision, which can infl uence their fi nal decision not only stochastically but also systematically (Ledyard 1995 (Ledyard , Špalek 2011 . With public goods, however, there may be a situation where individuals are not interested in expressing preferences in the consumption of public goods (Soukopová et al. 2014) . In this case, they prefer the possibility of becoming a free rider and thus avoid paying for consumed public goods. Th e free-rider problem leads to a number of practical problems in ensuring the production of public goods. Th ese are problems of a legal, economic, but also organisational nature, such as the choice of provider, producer and the levying of public goods.
If we do not perceive the individual as purely rational (homo oeconomicus), i.e. a person who is driven exclusively by "economic" motives in order to achieve the greatest possible material or monetary gain who would choose the free-rider strategy, but perceive their bounded rationality, bounded willpower and bounded self-interest, then it is possible to achieve desirable results by means of suitable settings of the conditions in which an individual decides. Bounded rationality (Mullainathan and Th aler 2000, Špalek and Řikovský 2019) refl ects the limited cognitive abilities that constrain human problem solving.
Consumer preference for the consumption of public goods
Th e classical and neoclassical economic theory is, or respectively was, based on the assumption that individuals (people) are strictly rational, take into account all circumstances in their decision-making and act to achieve their maximum benefi t. Objective people, however, do not fi t into the theory of economic theory. According to Th aler and Sunstein (2010), human errors are natural, infl uenced by prejudice, the social environment, and their choices, far from fi nding an ideal solution, contrary to what classical and neoclassical economic theory assumes.
In economic theory, there are certain goods (public goods - Samuelson 1954 Samuelson , 1955 , whose consumption is of interest to individuals, but if one is to pay for it, given the two characteristics (indivisibility of consumption and non-consumption), then a problem arises (market failure). In public goods, if an individual decides not to pay for their consumption, it is almost impossible to punish the relevant individual, i.e. impose some material, respectively non-material "punishment". If the community of individuals is large (e.g. the number of inhabitants of a particular country), the identifi cation of the non-paying individual, or respectively the illegal passenger, is technically impossible and / or economically demanding (Mikušová Meričková and Stejskal 2014) . Th e reason for choosing the free-rider strategy is the awareness of the individual that, regardless of his or her contribution, or their willingness, the public goods will be provided. Th e properties of indivisibility of consumption and the inexhaustibility of the consumption of public goods cause the market-price mechanism to fail completely, and as a consequence they cause state interventions, primarily in the form of direct state production or state fi nancing of consumption of these goods (Mikušová Meričková and Stejskal 2014) .
Market failure, however, as reported by Mikušová Meričková and Stejskal (2014) in the existence of public goods with the impossibility of exclusion from consumption justifi ed by the existence of a free rider based on the economic abstraction of homo oeconomicus is impossible, but this cannot be considered universally valid. Th e problem of the rationality of individual decision-making in the context of motives for collective collaboration (crowdfunding - Makýšová and Vaceková 2017) , which is a condition for multilateral exchanges enabling the production of public goods, is much more complex (Mikušová Meričková and Stejskal 2014) . Th is problem is based not only on the postulates of economic theory, but also on psychology. Th us, the classical and neoclassical economic theory must be put into reality and forced to accept it by factors of a psychological nature aff ecting people and their decisions (behavioural economics). We conclude that the realisation of public goods and services of public benefi t do not necessarily have to be realised in a non-market form based on collective decision-making. If individuals are aware that a particular property can be produced only as a result of voluntary cooperation (voluntary contribution or volunteering; Olson 2002) , i.e. a fi nancial fund will be created for its production, their willingness to pay to the production of the goods is higher (Cullis and Jones 1998, 21) . Individuals' decisions to enter voluntary bilateral exchanges are subject to the irrational eff ects of the environment or contextual effects, such as emotions and feelings from myopic planning and many other sources (Ariely 2009) . Th e result is errors that can be predicted and are always the same. Th is type of individual represents the already mentioned behavioural economy.
Public goods from the point of view of bounded rationality of individual action
In order to gain a better understanding of human behaviour, economics seeks to work with other scientifi c disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, or anthropology (behavioural economics). Unlike neoclassical economic theory, behavioural economics does not assume a rational individual. On the contrary, it focuses on an irrational individual while revealing what really infl uences their decision and actions.
Behavioural economics focuses on factors that may result in someone saying "yes" to someone, while they, in another instance, may respond "no" to the same requirement (Cialdini 2016) . Diamond and Vartiainen (2007) emphasise the positive efforts of behavioural economics, which extend the standard economic theory to new approaches that take into account the psychological motives of acting individuals. Taking into account the psychological motives involved in the decision-making of individuals, the result is more accurate predictions about the expected behaviour of individuals in a given situation.
According to Dolan et al. (2009) countries should seek to use these factors (Table 1) or, respectively, incentives aff ecting the actions of individuals in their favour, e.g. by fi nding out how individuals respond to factors and which of these factors are signifi cant to the individual (Bruni et al. 2019) . Accordingly, Dolan et al. (2009) defi ned the nine most important factors aff ecting individuals' behaviour, referred to as the MINDSPACE Concept. Th e assumption is that individuals, when deciding, analyse information in the form of countless stimuli (DellaVigna 2009), available from politicians, the state, municipalities and the market, resulting in decisions that refl ect their best interests in view of these incentives (Dolan et al. 2009 ). Th e fi rst of the factors defi ned by Dolan et al. (2009) is M (messenger) -message, i.e. the individual is infl uenced by who provided the information to them. Rather, individuals decide to respond to a message if they have been provided with the information by an expert, or by an authority (e.g. nutritional counsellor, research assistant, or someone who can convince others to agree on the basis of their generally respected expertise -Cialdini 2016) as a "layman" in a given area (such as a journal article; Webb and Sheeran 2006) . When there is some demographic and character similarity between the expert and the respondent, the eff ectiveness of the intervention is increased, resulting in the desired behaviour of the respondents (Durantini et al. 2006) .
Th e second of the factors aff ecting individuals is, according to Dolan et al. (2009) , I (incentives) -the incentive for an individual to avoid any loss resulting from the processing and evaluation of the information. It is necessary to fi nd out how individuals present the problem, what complex image they create and what mental models they use when making decisions. In relation to risk perception, it is important that individuals know what their money is used for, or when it will be used (Hardisty and Weber 2009; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Hardisty et al. 2013; Lussier et al. 2006) .
Th e third factor aff ecting the individual is N (norms) -norms, i.e. an individual's actions are infl uenced by what other individuals are doing. Social norms such as ethnicity (Andreoni et al. 2016; Luttmer 2001) , group size (Andreoni and Brownback 2017; Nosenzo et al. 2015) , affi liation (Fehr and Hoff 2011; Shayo 2009 ) various types of social groups (Chakravarty and Fonseca 2014) and cultural norms, e.g. religion (Andreoni et al. 2016) , handshakes and others, have a signifi cant impact on the behaviour of the individual, whether in a positive or negative sense.
Th e fourth factor aff ecting individuals' behaviour is D (defaults) -the default option, the individual "moves" in predetermined options. Th us, in a situation they repeatedly fi nd themselves in, individuals can benefi t from experience, but at the same time they can decide "by guessing" (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . Individuals have a strong tendency to adhere to the status quo, or the pre-set option (Th aler and Sunstein 2010).
Another factor aff ecting the individual is S (salience) -i.e. the attention of the individual is attracted by what is new and seems relevant to them. According to Cialdini (2016) , it is not the essence of changing the views, attitudes, or experiences of an individual. What matters is what the individual pays attention to when deciding. It is important to realise that attention is not always conscious, and oft en, when making a decision, an individual can be attracted by stimuli such as money, comfort, an advertising banner and so on (Mandel and Johnson 2002) .
Th e sixth of the factors aff ecting an individual is P (priming) -an individual's behaviour is infl uenced by subconscious suggestions, that is, if an individual is affected by a particular message (e.g. advertising) before a fi nal decision, the resulting decision may be diff erent. For example, the non-removal of graffi ti or illegal landfi ll may cause other individuals to behave in the same way (Keizer et al. 2008) .
Th e seventh of the factors is A (aff ect) -feelings or, respectively, emotional associations can infl uence an individual's actions. Emotional reactions (non-verbal reactions -facial expressions, gestures, etc.) to words, images and events that an individual perceives are much faster than an individual actually realises.
Another factor aff ecting an individual's behaviour is C (commitments) -an individual is trying to act in accordance with their commitments (promises) and in return demands the same action. Fulfi lment of commitments appears to be more effective if an individual incurs costs by violating it, and not necessarily just fi nancial costs (e.g., damage to reputation) (Dolan et al. 2009 ). Th e last factor, according to Dolan et al. (2009) infl uencing the individual is E (Ego) -ego, the individual acts in order to have the best possible feeling. If the individual or group in which the individual is present thrives, they attribute that success to their own skill; however, if the individual or group in which the individual is fails, then they attribute the faults or shortcomings to others or errors due to other factors determining a particular situation (Hewstone et al. 2002; Ross 1977) .
For politicians, professionals and communities, exploring the factors that infl uence individuals' willingness to collaborate is a potentially new way to change the behaviour of individuals. Th e idea should not be to promote "hard" state paternalism, but liberal paternalism, which pushes the individual to a "desirable or right" direction (Th aler and Sunstein 2010). Th e paper will focus on factors aff ecting individuals' willingness to pay.
Methodology
Th e aim of the paper is to investigate the factors of willingness to pay for public services.
We assumed that individuals are willing to pay, and their willingness is conditional on factors aff ecting them during their decision-making. In order to achieve this goal, we have set up research questions, which we will answer using mathematical-statistical methods: "Individuals are willing to pay and their willingness to pay is conditioned by factors aff ecting individuals during their decision-making. " RQ1: What motivates individuals to voluntary pay to the public good ? RQ2: How do the individual factors aff ect the amount of voluntary contribution granted ?
Th e factors of consumer willingness to pay to public goods and public services are examined. Factors that may infl uence the willingness of individuals to pay according to the concept of MINDSPACE (Dolan et al. 2009 ) are divided in nine groups (messenger, incentives, norms, defaults, salience, priming, aff ect, commitment, ego) ( Table 1) .
Th e MINDSPACE concept highlights the ways in which an individual can be "pushed" in terms of "desired" behaviour, e.g. if an individual is conveyed a message by someone who is pleasant or similar in something to the individual, the individual is, until we "strum the correct string" willing to respond to the message in a "desirable" way. Th us, when organising a campaign (e.g. crowdfunding), it is possible to achieve a higher success rate by selecting an appropriate leader who has nothing to do with the target group (e.g. a leader from a given community, a leader with a common life experience). One of the ways to fi nd out what psychological motives infl uence the behaviour of individuals is to use the apparatus of experimental economics.
Th e method of experimental economics is quite strictly defi ned. It stands on two pillars, i.e. replication and control options. Th e fi rst of the two pillars allows you to re-examine the behaviour of the people in the selected situation. By repeating one situation multiple times and then comparing the behaviour of respondents to the experiment, we can really examine whether people from diff er-ent social, demographic, or national groups behave diff erently. In the case of the repetition of a given situation, we encounter two terms -repetition, where the experimenter tries to strictly follow the form of a repeated experiment (the way of selecting respondents, their structure, the amount of reward, the way of realising the experiment, the wording of instructions) and replication (when there are slight or substantial changes in the implementation of the experiment (Špalek 2011, 94) . As stated by Guala (2005, 15) , repetition allows only a comparison of the results of an identical experiment, while replication allows demonstrating that the experiment-identifi ed phenomenon is robust enough to make small or even substantial changes to the experiment setting. In order to truly consider an economic experiment an experimental method, it is necessary to maintain full control over its entire course. Th e possibility of control causes a problem in applying the experiment to a real, fi eld environment. While in the laboratory environment there is a possibility to manipulate the conditions of the experiment through different settings of conditions aimed at the verifi cation of individual parameters and their eff ects on the behaviour of the participants, in real, fi eld conditions such control is very unusual or even impossible. Smith (1982, 931 -935) lists four conditions that are suffi cient to obtain and maintain control over respondent preferences in a simulated microeconomic environment: nonsatiation, saliency, dominance and privacy.
Th e most important of Smith's (1982) terms is the condition of the materiality of the reward. Participants in the experiments should receive a reward that is adequate for the issue under consideration. Cash reward is considered to be the most appropriate form of compensation. It is a reward that motivates respondents to behave in a given situation in a way that matches their real-life behaviour if they face a similar situation (Špalek 2011) . Using non-fi nancial reward may result in distortion or monetary illusion, if experimenters use a laboratory token with a predetermined rate, or if they use a form of remuneration in kind, behaviour that diff ers significantly from real behaviour in a similar situation.
In addition to the remuneration, the limitation of economic experiments is the unrepresentative selection of tested persons (economic experiments work mainly with students -Alm and Jacobson 2007), simplifying the modelled situation (real situations are more complicated than those trying to simulate laboratory experiments), undistorted, so-called the experimenter eff ect that underscores the right or expected results, allowing respondents, as reported by Fehr (2003) , to do exactly what they think is expected of them and adjusting the risk-prone (it is important to set up an experiment to force the respondent to risk neutrality, regardless of whether it is a risk-seeking person or a risk-averse person -Fehr 2003) .
A possible solution to avoid the limits of the economic experiment (the amount of remuneration and the unrepresentative selection of test persons) is to use the population-based survey experiment (Mutz 2011) . Oral or written inter-viewing techniques may not necessarily have to be used in population experimental surveys, and the experiment may even take place in a diff erent environment than a laboratory. Instead, in an experimental population survey, tools are used to obtain a representative sample of respondents that represents the target population for a particular theory, whether it is a state, ethnic group, or another subculture (Mutz 2011) . One of the indisputable advantages of a population experimental survey, unlike the experiment, is that it does not require the personal participation of respondents in the lab but allows it to be implemented via an online tool, such as Google Forms.
We will formulate our population experimental research on the basis of theoretical knowledge of the studied issue and experiments performed so far. In developing the experimental research, we collaborated with a sociologist, statistician, and employee of the organisation in which the results of the experimental survey were to be applied to ensure the validity and statistical signifi cance of the experiment. Th e experimental research will provide the data necessary for further processing (control and study group). Th e control group in our case was respondents using the services of the Fončorda Community Centre. Th e control group of the experimental survey was approached directly by us at an event organised by the Fončorda Community Centre in October 2018. Th e surveyed group is represented by respondents approached with the help of full-time students of the Basics of Public Economics and Public Economics at the Faculty of Economics MBU. Students were provided with paper-based questionnaires along with a reply sheet. At the same time, they were able to use the electronic version of the questionnaire created through Google Forms, which they could send to selected people. Th e total number of students involved in the experimental survey was 23.
One of the practical challenges of the population experimental survey is the questions to propose. In this case, questions should not only focus on whether an independent variable has an impact on a dependent variable, but also on how to formulate questions and the problem itself to encourage individuals to change their behaviour. In our experimental research, this means that if an individual did not pay to a collection or project in 2018, they would pay to the project we created aft er formulating the problem, or, how many respondents we were able to convince about the importance of our community project. In the population experimental survey, it is also of importance how the questions are laid down and in which order (e.g. identifying with the statement, past experience with the community centre). By fi rst asking the respondents a question relating to a statement to the given declaration, we assumed that the respondent would remember their mark on the scale which would infl uence them when making further decisions. It was also important for us to fi nd out whether or not the respondent has experience with the community centre. According to our assumption, the experience of an individual with the community centre, whether positive or negative, could signifi cantly infl uence the willingness of individuals to pay. Th e order of questions thus set up should not adversely aff ect the results of the experimental survey (Baethge et al. 2015; Mutz 2011) .
We used the work of Berlinski and Busso (2016) to construct our experimental survey. Th e fi rst part of the experimental survey is focused on fi nding the real state and then verifying the answers. Experimental research is a combination of "experimental" questions and questionnaire questions that may occur at the beginning and end of an experimental survey. Questionnaire questions were in our case focused on the willingness of individuals to pay in 2018 or to carry out voluntary work in 2018, to measure the level of agreement with a given factor and socio-demographic features. Considering the 43 factors expressed through 48 statements which may infl uence the willingness of individuals to pay or to do volunteer work, we have chosen a question with a scaled response option, since in a conventional laboratory experiment under normal conditions it is not possible to examine the range of factors aff ecting an individual's willingness to cooperate. Th e experimental part of our survey included questions that we formulated in diff erent situations, i.e. diff erent mechanisms, with varying degrees of volunteering, where individuals should decide whether and how much they will pay or not pay to public goods, a public service (repetition of the situation under changed conditions -conjoint experiment - James et al. 2017) . Questionnaire questions were used to determine the real state and follow-up form of control. It means that if an individual has answered this question truthfully, they should answer the next one truthfully, and thus we will avoid deliberately "overestimating" their behaviour.
We provided the condition of control in the experimental survey with the same input information. Our trained students should not interfere in any way with the instructions of the experimental survey. Individuals only knew what we had told them at the beginning of Google Forms. Of course, we admit that during the fi lling-out stage, they might have been disturbed by environmental infl uences, and there could have been a diff erent focus on fi lling out the form, but the same distortion may also be caused by the experimenter in the lab experiment (for example, if they are wearing something inappropriate).
Although we did not reward the respondents and in no way motivate their behaviour, by pointing out to them the amount of the total levy and tax burden, we could motivate them to approach the assessment of the contribution "responsibly" with respect to their overall net monthly income.
With slight modifi cations, we have followed almost all the conditions of the experiment, i.e. repetition, control, "reward -fi nancial motivation", though in a diff erent form than in laboratory experiments. Respondents responded to various hypothetical situations (which do not exist in the questionnaire survey). Th e questionnaire asks questions that the respondent can actually answer and which are not hypothetical (e.g. how much of your income are travel expenses etc.). Th ey do not consider these questions in the light of the situation that might arise if they decided to pay to the project. It may happen that a city or organisation may access a service charge due to the results of an experimental survey and the expressed willingness of consumers. Th us, the individual must also take this risk into account (Ariely and Kreisler 2018) . While on the question of the type of your travel, dining, and housing costs per month, they only consider their own situation with no risk attached to it, which basically does not aff ect their response. However, in our experimental survey, this risk must be perceived and taken into account in the decision.
At the beginning of our survey, we informed the respondents about the focus of the survey, which monitors factors aff ecting individuals' willingness to pay to public goods. In order to avoid any distortion as to what public goods are, we defi ned them at the outset.
In the fi rst part of the survey we presented the respondents with projects that they could support on the website www.dobrakrajina.sk. Th en we asked them why they decided to support the project or decided not to. We also asked respondents whether they supported a collection in 2018 (e.g. Daff odil Day (Deň narcisov), Good Angel (Dobrý anjel)) or a project published on websites such as www.dobrakrajina.sk, www.kickstarter.com, www.startlab.com. If they supported a collection or project, we asked them about the amount and regularity of the voluntary contribution. As with the fi rst question, we asked what had led them to fi nancially support or not to support such an initiative.
Th e second part of the survey contained 48 statements which respondents were to comment on. Based on the answers to these statements, we examined the impact of individual factors on the willingness of individuals to pay to public goods. Respondents were to express their degree of identifi cation with the given statement on a scale of 1 -I totally agree with the statement to 5 -I totally disagree with the statement. Respondents were asked to mark their answer with a cross. Th e questions were formulated neutrally, and respondents were not infl uenced to make the "right" decisions. Th e statements from 1 to 46 were drawn up positively, while statements 47 to 48 were drawn up negatively.
Subsequently, we processed the research outputs using relevant mathematical-statistical methods and evaluated the results. At this stage, we will evaluate the survey and compare the results we fi nd with the secondary sources and the surveys conducted so far. Th e obtained data are processed by selected mathematical-statistical methods. We use the IBM SPSS Statistics 19 statistical soft ware for evaluation; when evaluating, we consider the signifi cance level of 0.05. For statistical methods we use a chi-square test, descriptive statistics, Spearman's correlation coeffi cient, ANOVA method, Cramer's V and binary logistic regression.
Research questions have been determined by using inductive-deductive methods that have allowed us to fi nd assumed factors aff ecting individuals' willingness to pay to public goods. We use the synthesis, induction and deduction as well as generalisation in the logical verifi cation of the results, their summary and presentation of the work outputs.
Due to the possibility of applying the results of the experimental survey in the public-sector decision-making sector in solving the issue of charging for public services and in the management of non-governmental non-profi t organisations, we co-operated with the employees of the Fončorda Community Centre and the city of Banská Bystrica, specifi cally with the head employee of the Department of Social Aff airs. Th e experimental survey included questions about voluntary contributions in 2018. If they answered positively, i.e. that in 2018 they paid to a collection or project, we asked them about the amount of the voluntary contribution in 2018.
Th e experimental survey contained 48 statements which respondents were to comment on. Based on the answers to these statements, we examined the impact of individual factors on the willingness of individuals to pay. Respondents were to express their degree of identifi cation with the given statement on a scale of 1 -I totally agree with the statement to 5 -I totally disagree with the statement. Th e questions were formulated neutrally, and respondents were not infl uenced to make the "right" decisions. Finally, we asked respondents about demographic and socio-economic characteristics.
Data
Th e subject of our experimental survey applied to the selected public goods is heterogeneous in terms of gender, age, and educational attainment. Th e basic sample consists of inhabitants of the Slovak Republic above the age of 18. Th e basic sample is a statistical set that is made up of all statistical units that meet the required characteristics. Due to the extensive basic sample (population of Slovakia over 18 years of age), we have to determine the research sample that we obtained by quota selection. Th e quota selection is characterised by the determination of the characteristics that each unit of the research object possesses and is given certain statistical features to describe it (in our case, e.g. gender, age category, highest level of education). Subsequently, quotas for each designated character are determined. Quotas are designed so that the target population structure, i.e. the basic sample, coincided with the structure of the research sample (Markechová et al. 2011) . Our research sample (368) of respondents is structured in such a way that by its structure according to the basic features of sex, age category and highest achieved education it corresponds to the basic sample of all inhabitants of the Slovak Republic (Table 2) .
Our research sample of 368 respondents is structured in such a way that by its structure according to gender, age category and highest achieved education it corresponds to the basic sample of all Slovak citizens (Table 2) . To verify the representativeness of the research sample in relation to the basic sample, we used the chi-square test. We found that the research sample is representative of all sorting characters, i.e. gender, age category, highest educational attainment (p-value 0.959; 0.973; 0.559). Th e results found in the survey can be generalised to all inhabitants of the Slovak Republic. 
Results
In this section we will look at the factors aff ecting the willingness of individuals to pay. We will try to answer the research question "What motivates individuals to voluntary pay to the public good".
Th e factors that infl uence individuals' willingness to pay have been analysed on the basis of the respondents' opinions on 48 statements (Table 3) . In doing so, respondents could either fully agree with the statement, i.e. choose option 1 -totally agree, or not agree with the claim at all and choose option 5 -I totally disagree. Th e lower the average value for a given claim, the greater the recognition of the respondent's opinion. Th e following table (Table 3) shows the percentage rate of identifi cation with those who paid to a collection or project in 2018 and those who did not pay to any collection or project in 2018.
Th e highest average degree of identifi cation with the claims was priming for a group of factors. Th ese are subconscious factors that infl uence the behaviour of an individual. When an individual is confronted with a "suff ering individual" when making their decision, that decision may be diff erent than if they are asked to do so on account of "a healthy individual". Th e individual is thus ultimately infl uenced by the environment in which they are when making the decision, i.e. they adapt to what they see or hear (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2003; Greitemeyer 2009 ).
Table 3
Percentage of identifi cation with a given claim for those who paid and for those who did not pay in 2018 according to concept MINDSPACE Source: Authors, 2019 What is interesting, for example, is the diff erence in the claims concerning the belief in justice. Respondents who paid in 2018 identifi ed with the claim, "we need to help each other because life was unfair to some", and with the claim "I pay to ensure equality in society".
While respondents who pay feel the need to express their aff ection and sympathy for others, non-contributors do not consider this to be the main reason why they should pay to public goods or to a collection or project. In their case, the rea-son why they would decide to pay to public goods depends more on increasing their social status, making themselves visible in society, or more precisely having their contribution appreciated by society.
Whether they are contributors or not, they have the same attitude in the case of the factor of the situation. Respondents cannot clearly assess whether they need a longer time to think it over if they are asked to make a contribution.
Th e interdependence between individual factors was determined by using the Spearman correlation coeffi cient.
We have determined the rate / degree of interrelationship as follows: we evaluate the values of the correlation coeffi cient (rs) in the interval from 0 to | 0.3 | as weak direct or indirect dependence, we evaluate values in the range from | 0.3 | to | 0.6 | as mean direct or indirect dependence and values in the interval from | 0.6 | to | 1 | are evaluated as a strong direct or indirect dependence.
Th e lowest average identifi cation rate was the commitment factor. For individuals, it is not just the reciprocal eff ect, or the reciprocity rule, a clear reason why they should pay or not. Using the Spearman correlation coeffi cient, we investigated whether there is a dependency between the diff erent groups of factors or whether these factors aff ect the amount of voluntary contribution granted (Table 4) . In case an individual identifi ed with statements in the report group, e.g. "Th ere are certain activities that I have a specifi c interest in, and that is why I participate in them as a contributor", that means that they also identifi ed with statements in the group of standards, prominence and incentive. "I only pay in my neighbourhood, in activities that address current and urgent problems; I feel belonging to a certain group of people. " Using the Spearman correlation coeffi cient, we found out which of these groups of factors infl uence the willingness of individuals to pay.
Th e results show that between the willingness of individuals to pay and groups of factors there is moderate direct dependence in case of groups: Messenger, Incentive, Norms, Standard, Salience and Priming. Th is means that the willingness of individuals to pay is dependent, for example, on the individual's relationship with the organization, the employees of the organization, or whether they sympathizes with those for whom the fundraising and the project is intended.
In other cases, a weak direct dependence between the willingness of individuals to pay and groups of factors was confi rmed. Th e group of factors "Ego" was mainly a weak direct dependence.
Taking into account the amount of the voluntary contribution, the groups of factors Messenger, Standard, Commitment and Ego aff ect the fi nal decision of an individual. Th ere is a slight indirect dependence between the amount of the contribution and the degree of identifi cation with the statements. If an individual identifi ed with a given assertion from the group of factors "Ego", e.g. "I pay because I can increase my social status", the amount of their voluntary contribution increased (p-value 0.019, rs = -0.153). Th e amount of the contribution besides the Ego group is indirectly infl uenced by Messenger and Commitment (p-value 0.019; 0.000, rs = -0.153; -0.228) and directly by the Incentive (p-value 0.019, rs = 0.152). Th e amount of the voluntary contribution in this case is not directly dependent on whether the individual identifi ed with the statement, e.g. "I pay out of respect for the weak and the poor. " Th e relationship between socio-demographic factors and a group of factors is shown in the following table (Table 5 ). To determine the relationship, we used the Spearman correlation coeffi cient for ordinal variables such as age and number of members, and Cramer V for nominal variables such as gender and economic activity. For other socio-demographic factors we found no relation or, respectively, no dependence. For example, younger individuals are motivated to pay if their actions are valued by society, so as to be able to increase their status in society, or as long as they believe that they can improve an existing situation, condition or thing. On the contrary, for older individuals, these are precisely the reasons why they should not pay. In the case of gender, it has been confi rmed to us that the feeling of voluntary contribution, such as empathy, feeling good, believing in justice, and so on is important for women. On the contrary, men pay in a situation where they are asked to do so when a given collection or project addresses an urgent issue in their neighbourhood.
To answer research question no. 2, it was necessary to adjust the range of the research sample. In this case, we selected those respondents who answered positively to the question "Did you pay in 2018 to a collection or project ?" Th ere were 237 respondents. Th e average voluntary contribution for this group of respondents was €58.38. Th e maximum amount of the voluntary contribution was €600. Th e reason for which the respondents gave a voluntary contribution of €600 was that they were acting properly (an altruistic factor).
In order not to limit respondents' responses to the amount of fi nancial contributions made in 2018, we kept this question open. However, based on the respondents' answers, the following contribution rates have been set for its subsequent evaluation and determination of the dependence between factors and the amount of fi nancial contribution provided (Table 6) : Source: Authors, 2019
Using the Spearman correlation coeffi cient, we found that there is a moderate indirect dependence between the conscience, that there is a medium indirect dependency between the commitment of society and the amount of the voluntary fi nancial contribution, i.e. the more an individual agrees with the statement "because I'm doing alright", the higher the voluntary contribution in 2018 (p-value = 0; rs = -0.337). Th e table of other dependencies is included in the next table (Table 7) . Source: Authors, 2019 In this case, we can say that the amount of the voluntary contribution depends in particular on the situation in which the individual decides whether or not to off er the voluntary contribution. At the same time, no altruistic factor (e.g. social rule, empathy) or social factor (volunteering and civil participation) is involved in the decision-making of an individual when deciding on the amount of a voluntary contribution. Th e amount of the voluntary contribution may also relate, inter alia, to how the individual earned the money (for example from work, winning the lottery, fi nding it on the pavement, an inheritance, embezzlement or gambling). Interestingly, the way the money itself was obtained can greatly aff ect how an individual uses it. If an individual has obtained money that makes them feel guilty, they are likely to devote some of their money to a collection or project or to a charitable purpose (Levav and McGraw 2009) . We try to "launder" the money earned in bad circumstances, while we try to enjoy the money we receive as a gift and consider the money we earn from the hard work as that which we deserve. Money earned through work we spend on "responsible" things, while money from winnings is usually spent on entertainment (mental accounting -Ariely and Kreisler 2018). In doing so, an individual justifi es their negative feelings about the way in which money is obtained, and ultimately justifi es its spending.
Th e reasons why respondents paid in 2018 were: I can pay because I have enough money; it has led me to thinking that the people for whom the money is collected, can use it for more useful things which can help them; I would probably not invest in something useful; compassion, belonging, feeling good, relatives, friends and acquaintances contributing, etc. In the following graph (Figure 1) , the answers of 237 respondents are broken down by their contributions in 2018.
Figure 1 Distribution of respondents by regularity of contribution in 2018
Source: Authors, 2019.
Th e average amount of collected contribution from respondents who only paid once in 2018 was €10.37, while for respondents who paid several times it was €78.35 and €86.93 from respondents who paid on a regular basis.
If the respondent chose the answer "several times", we asked them how many times they had paid to a collection or project in 2018. Based on the respondents' responses, we then set contribution intervals. 68 respondents paid 1 to 3 times in 2018, 47 respondents paid 4 to 5 times, 14 respondents paid 6 to 9 times, 7 respondents paid 10 to 20 times, and 1 respondent paid more than 20 times.
If the respondent chose to give the answer "regularly", we asked them how oft en they paid to a collection or project within a year. Based on the respondents' answers, we then set intervals for the contribution rate. 6 respondents regularly pay 1 to 3 times a year, 7 respondents pay 4 to 9 times a year, 12 respondents pay 10 to 20 times a year, and 1 respondent pay more than 20 times a year.
Table 8
Interdependence between factors and contribution rate in 2018 (n = 237) In addition to the amount of voluntary fi nancial contributions and contribution intervals, we have determined whether there is a relationship between the voluntary contribution interval and the factors aff ecting individuals (Table 8 ).
Using the Spearman correlation coeffi cient, we conclude that the regularity of the contribution to individuals is mainly dependent on the factor "relationship to organization or employees", i.e. if there are certain activities that an individual is interested in, they will pay regularly to their functioning. On the other hand, however, it can be said that the individual's willingness and regularity of contribution is not limited to whether the activity is provided as a collective asset, i.e. fi nanced by the city or municipal budget. If an individual is interested in a given activity and is willing to provide it, they are willing, or even to pay to it regularly.
Linear regression analysis can be used when working with an ordinal variable, such as education, age category, and so on. In the case of nominal variables such as, e.g., providing, or not providing voluntary contribution, binary logistic regression is used. Th e dependent variable in our case becomes 0, the respondent did not provide a voluntary fi nancial contribution in 2018, and 1, the respondent provided a voluntary fi nancial contribution in 2018. Th e likelihood that a phenomenon occurs (the respondent gives a voluntary contribution) is called the chance of a phenomenon (ODDS) and the ODDS logarithm is called logit. If the probability is greater than 0.5, then the phenomenon has become (1), if it is lower than 0.5, the phenomenon has become (0).
We used the Wald test to evaluate the relationship between the willingness to pay in 2018 and our independent variables. Nagelkerke's statistics is 0.525. Th is means that the model explains 50 % of the variability of the dependent variable. 55 variables entered the model. Th e original model was in 42 steps, reduced to 14 variables. Th e regression model parameter estimates with all 14 explanatory variables and their standard deviations are in column B and S.E. in Table 9 .
Based on Wald's test, we found a signifi cant impact of almost all variables, except for the invitation to participate, the by-stander eff ect and tax-policy variables (p-value is 0.085; 0.056; 0.063). A positive sign of coeffi cient B increases probability, i.e. as long as the individual agrees with the claim, the willingness to pay increases, while the negative sign reduces the probability, i.e. an individual identifying with a claim causes a decrease in willingness to pay. As with linear regression, it is important to realise that increasing a single variable by one means a higher degree of identifi cation with a given factor. By changing the highest education level achieved by one level, the willingness to pay increases 1.625 times. For example, if the degree of identifi cation with a given factor, e.g. the need of belonging somewhere, increases, it means that the willingness to pay increases. Th e Hosmer-Lemeshow test compares the observed and expected frequency of occurrence of the observed phenomenon. In our case it indicates a good match between the detected and expected frequencies, i.e. it is insignifi cant (p-value 0.385). Th e classifi cation success rating is 82.6 %. Source: Authors, 2019 Variables that increase the likelihood of voluntary contribution include the need to belong, appreciation, political infl uence, information, and education. Variables reducing the likelihood of voluntary contribution include feeling good, conviction, moral duty, the size of the public sector, belief in justice, volunteering, and civic participation.
Th e results are interesting from the point of view of a suitable arrangement of fundraising activities, which would be closer to the Pareto eff ective state, and they answer the question "how is it necessary to change the way of raising funds from contributors, so that their (voluntary) contribution increases ?" Also, in the case of factors where dependence was proven, appropriate stimulation should be provided or the parameters of the collection or project should be set to increase the willingness of individuals to pay to the selected project. In our survey, we have stimulated individuals' willingness to pay through the enhancement of positive impacts on society by implementing the project.
Discussion
However, how can this knowledge of individual behaviour in the management of NGO fundraising activities be used ? First, we found out which of the factors aff ect individuals regarding their decision to cooperate. In the case of willingness to pay, it is the need to belong somewhere, the good feeling, the individual's beliefs, moral duty, the size of the public sector, faith in justice, political infl uence, voluntary and civic participation, information and education of the individual. Individuals' willingness to engage in volunteering is infl uenced mainly by fundraising methods, beliefs, the nature of the situation, the relationship with the organization and employees, personal contacts, respect and information. As long as the NGO knows what factors infl uence the willingness of individuals to cooperate and is aware of the limits of voluntary cooperation (we forget that everything is relative, we judge others, avoid pain, trust ourselves, overestimate our property, believe in the magic of language and rituals, overestimate our expectations, prices, etc. -Ariely and Kreisler 2018), it can use them for their benefi t in selecting and constructing a suitable fundraising campaign. Th ere are several mechanisms available to pay to the work of NGOs (auctions, lotteries, threshold setting, crowdfunding campaigns, direct donations, etc.).
When constructing a fundraising campaign, it is important to highlight the positive aspects of the campaign itself. Unless an individual is confronted with how they can help by contributing, their willingness to cooperate decreases. Let us remember the situation when someone stopped you on the street. How many times have you paid to the "treasure box" when only the name of the NGO was told ? We assume that the answer is close to zero. However, another situation occurs when an individual is confronted directly with what or whom they can help. Th e act of contribution rewards an individual with a good feeling, thus it plays an important role in the voluntary cooperation itself. Ultimately, the aim of any fundraising campaign should be to present a transparent campaign (not "creative accounting") with a clear goal of using the voluntary contributions, giving the NGO the confi dence of potential contributors.
If we want to encourage some behaviour, it is necessary to make the decision easy, attractive, socially anchored and timely. Th ere are several examples of successful use of behavioural knowledge and push techniques (nudge) in the public sector. A simple change, such as modifying the structure and content of tax forms, can pay to changing the behaviour of taxpayers; e.g. the number of late tax returns will be reduced. Likewise, changing the wording of letters to individuals or organizations that have not met their tax obligations, referring to social intervention by adding a sentence with the reminder that "most people (organizations) pay taxes on time", increased the tax payments by several percent and tax revenues by several million pounds (Halpern 2016) . If individuals do not know how to behave in a given situation, they will look at how others behaved in a similar situation, especially those with whom they have identifi ed and will adapt their behaviour accordingly. By personalizing messages or reminders, e.g. by sending a photo of a car that has violated the rules to the owner of the car, an increase in paying of the fi nes can be achieved. Written communication of public institutions with individuals is more eff ective when written in simple structured language, at the outset the message is clearly communicated and is highly personalized (Halpern 2016) .
Th e BIT (Behavioural Insights Team 2015) fi ndings show that by eliminating unnecessary page clicks, simplifying document access and directing to the exact page where the necessary form opens, the number of fi led tax returns increased by 4.2 % (from 19.2 % to 23.4 %). However, the measure is not expensive.
Th e timing of the intervention is also important. In case the individual must confi rm the correctness of the data provided with their signature, it is advisable to choose the signature at the beginning of the form instead of at the end. In this case, the handwritten signature activates one's sense of duty for a short term, which translates into a more responsible approach when fi lling in forms, even if the individual may not realize it. In the case of tax collection, BIT (2015) proposes to provide consulting services to newly formed entities. It appears that if organizations pay taxes in the fi rst years of their existence, they tend to behave in a similar way in the future.
On the one hand there are push techniques which are desirable, e.g. reducing the number of defaulters, health-care measures such as vouchers for preventive check-ups, adverts like "will you eat cakes during Christmas ? You should consider using the stairs", recommendations about the drinking regime like "put a glass of water on the table in the morning", increasing the number of job seekers or increasing the savings of individuals.
On the other hand, there are push techniques for which we wonder if they are still desirable. An example of such a nudge is the cooperation between BIT and Legal Services in the UK, who tested whether social interventions have an impact on individuals' decisions about their last will, namely whether they would be willing to pay to a charity fund. Th ey found that, unless they have asked individuals to pay, the average amount of the contribution was £ 3,300. Secondly, they asked if their testament would include a voluntary contribution to the charity fund. Th is led to an average contribution of £ 3,110. In the third case, social intervention was to aff ect individuals, quoting "most of our customers would leave a voluntary donation to the charity in their last will". Next they asked them about the reason why they decided to pay. In the third case they have managed to increase the willingness to pay by 15 %, while on average they collected £6,661.
In our view, another controversial example is the cooperation of Mindworx, the League Against Cancer and O2 (Mindworx 2019) . Th e aim of the cooperation was to increase the effi ciency of the SMS campaign. Originally, the League Against Cancer wanted to use the text "Help people with cancer and get involved in Daff odil Day." Instead, Mindworx proposed three versions of the SMS. Th e fi rst version of the report read: "Th is year, thousands of people will join the Daff odil Day. Become a donor too …" Th e second version of the message was "Join the thousands of O2 customers who will support Daff odil Day this year. " And the third version of the message was "If you were in need, we would also help you. You can help today by supporting Daff odil Day …" In the fi rst version of the SMS, the principle of identity determination was used (the need to belong somewhere), in the second version the principle of identifi cation with the person (imitation) was used, and in the last version the principle of reciprocity was used. Th ese individual versions of the SMS were tested on 8,000 O2 customers, while the third version of the SMS proved to be the most eff ective (an increase of 55 % compared to the original SMS). However, we wonder whether it really is about supporting a good cause or just a hidden manipulation to get the most out of individual, so-called sales practices at demonstration events for seniors (Scammers). Additionally Good Gift (Dobrý darček), which is an initiative of the non-profi t organization Good Angel (Dobrý anjel), is also worth considering. Good feeling in this case becomes a commodity that can be given to someone.
So where does the line end, where do you push an individual with an aim to increase his welfare, and where does the line begin when nudging an individual is more of a manipulative technique with the goal to change their behaviour and make them make decisions with appropriately chosen words which they would not ultimately do ?
Conclusion
We assumed that individuals are willing to pay to public goods, services of public benefi t, and their willingness is determined by factors infl uencing their decision-making. To answer the research questions, we used the data obtained from the survey. Th e results of the research confi rmed that there are factors that infl uence the willingness of individuals to pay. It turns out that an individual's decision is largely dependent on what the individual feels in decision-making (fear, joy, feeling good, belief in justice, etc.), what is the contextual eff ect (which can be reversed by an individual's decision, what do their decisions benefi t, the nature of the situation, etc.) how the individual perceives themselves (ego of the individual), what are the social rules, but also the infl uence of family, friends, loved ones and neighbours (Ariely and Kreisler 2018; Dolan et al. 2009; Th aler and Sunstein 2010) . Due to the various distortions aff ecting the decision-making of individuals that an individual can make, but in most cases is unaware of, they cannot rely solely on their own genius. Excessive confi dence in one's own ability oft en leads to ineff ective decisions that are greatly distorted by the fi rst impression.
Factors such as aff ection and sympathy, empathy, conviction, compassion, pity, respect, good feelings, commitment to society, appreciation, invitation to participate, fundraising methods, and tax policy infl uence the willingness of individuals to pay. Th ese factors have infl uenced the willingness of individuals to pay to almost all the decisions made regarding the willingness to pay and the amount of voluntary contribution granted.
According to Dolan et al. (2009) the research into factors infl uencing individuals' behaviour should be included in the potentially powerful tools that countries, professionals and communities can use to help address societal challenges (obesity, crime, environmental sustainability, and others). Applying the MINDSPACE concept to them can lead to lower costs and pain by changing the established habits of individuals (e.g. paying -Ariely and Kreisler 2018).
Although these factors are a powerful tool that countries, professionals, and communities can use, there is uncertainty about their duration, as well as uncertainty about their actions, along with other factors, or how these factors act under certain circumstances, or whether the eff ect of factors on one population group will be the same as that of the other group (Dolan et al. 2009 ), or whether it will vary depending on, e.g., gender (Einolf 2011) , education (Frank et al. 1993) , religion (Andreoni et al. 2016) , group size (Nosenzo et al. 2015) , and to what extent countries, professionals and communities should apply these factors to decision-making with regard to their weight (Dolan et al. 2009 ).
However, to what extent is it appropriate to infl uence the behaviour of the individual by pushing them in the right places (emotions, feelings, ego, etc.)? Where does "push" end and psychic pressure begin ? We will leave the answer to this question to you. However, we believe that the role of the state should be at least to provide individuals with information about the existence of factors that can signifi cantly infl uence their decision-making and actions.
Appendix 1 Binary logistic regression

Model Summary
Step a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than 0.001.
b. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than 0.001.
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